Speech by Minister of Defence Antti Häkkänen at the Annual Meeting of Heads of Mission on 25 August 2025
Distinguished Ambassadors, ladies and gentlemen,
Defence policy has taken centre stage following the rise in military tensions in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and China’s military build-up have realigned international defence policy.
We see it in our workload at the Ministry of Defence. We deal daily with homeland defence, NATO’s defence policy, the EU, defence cooperation, comprehensive security and our support to Ukraine.
Every day, we are in close contact with our European and North American allies and with NATO partners in Asia. Our field of operations is expanding all the time thanks to the growing market opportunities for defence industry. And the network of diplomatic missions abroad is an important partner in our efforts to promote our common cause.
Today, I will discuss three points that are all topical. They are Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, Russia’s post-Ukraine-war threat and Finland’s defence policy trends.
Dear Ambassadors, I will start with a couple of topical perspectives on the war in Ukraine.
The frontlines remain largely unchanged. Both combatants have gained some small local success in the past weeks. However, this has little bearing on the big picture.
Russia is helped by its resilience to losses and its ability to transform its industry to the needs of war. It receives support from its closest allies, Iran, China and North Korea.
The future of the battlefield is ultramodern unmanned systems, long-range strikes and traditional infantry war of positions.
The war in Ukraine has shown that to succeed you have to have a vast array of forces, firepower and state-of-the-art systems. For both sides the ability to recruit sufficient number of motivated people who are fit for war is imperative. At the same time, the war in Ukraine has highlighted the importance of harnessing innovation and tapping on the industrial potential on a large scale.
The way the war in Ukraine ends will shape the security pillars of Europe far into the future.
Russia is in no hurry to make peace or agree on a ceasefire. Indeed, protracted peace talks serve Russia’s interests in many ways. Russia believes that democratic states will tire of supporting Ukraine and that this will help Russia achieve its objectives. It can still tolerate the price of the economic sanctions. In fact, it seems that Russia has no genuine will to negotiate an end to the war.
To achieve peace, it is important to the United States and Europe engage in closer dialogue. However, it also seems clear that more concrete action is needed to restore peace in Ukraine. We must continue to strengthen our support to Ukraine and increase economic pressure on Russia to coax Russia into genuine peace talks.
Even if a ceasefire is reached and peace restored, Ukraine will still be needing our support. The first and foremost task is to ensure Ukraine’s security arrangements, meaning that we must continue to support Ukraine in the fields of armament, education and training, industry and economy.
There is also talk of security guarantees alongside security arrangements. The Finnish defence administration is currently reviewing the content of such security guarantees and preparing for them.
Geography dictates that Finland has a special role when security guarantees are being discussed. We have NATO’s longest border with Russia.
Talk of security guarantees should look beyond Russia’s war against Ukraine and examine the big picture of the European security architecture. The same forces must be able to protect NATO’s borders.
Dear friends, next I will turn to developments in our security environment and Russia’s rearmament for the post-Ukraine-war era.
A dangerous scenario is that Russia will continue its military build-up after the war in Ukraine has ended, drawing on its war economy resources and its defence industry, which has become more efficient. It will also deploy battle-hardened forces in garrisons in our neighbouring areas.
Russia has continued to develop its garrisons and forces in Finland’s neighbouring areas, and it has increased the number of troops there.
Russia will become even more dangerous if the sanctions against it are lifted. Then, Russia would have even bigger financial resources to develop its armed forces rapidly and in mass.
Russia has shown with its rhetoric and actions that it is prepared to use armed forces and non-military means to achieve its goals.
Finland has been the target of light hybrid influence activities in recent years. Examples include GPS signal disruptions, cyber attacks, instrumentalised migration and the damage to critical undersea infrastructure in the past two years.
Russia’s aggression will not end if peace is restored in Ukraine. This is the prospect Europe must entertain. If we prepare prudently, we can mitigate future threats.
We are in a race against time.
Each European state must act quickly to strengthen security and defence. Our security depends not only on homeland defence but also on the continued US commitment to European security and on European countries making rapid progress in bolstering their defence.
The NATO Summit decisions in June and the EU’s new resolve are an excellent common foundation.
Dear Ambassadors,
We at the Ministry of Defence prepare defence policy based on four pillars, which are the development of homeland defence, NATO, defence cooperation and comprehensive security.
The Government Defence Report was approved by Parliament in June. The report gives excellent grounds and goals for long-term development of defence.
This work is based on a realistic assessment of the threats against us and of the developments in our operating environment. It also pays close attention to the requirements of NATO’s collective defence.
The Government Defence Report sets great demands for the development of our defence. Finland will need to sustain its capability to counter broad-spectrum influencing, resist protracted military pressure and fight large-scale wars dragging on for years.
Our allies in NATO are also preparing for the same threats.
According to the defence report, Finland’s geographical location at NATO’s external border will make it even more important to ensure that Finland has sufficient defence resources far into the future. The minimum level of Finland’s defence budget will need to comply with the NATO guideline for defence spending, agreed by Allies.
Threat from Russia and the uncertainties in our security environment necessitate extensive measures. And these measures require resources.
The Allies’ commitment at the June NATO Summit to invest at least 3.5% of GDP on core defence requirements means significant additional investments in Finland’s defence and security in the 2020s and the 2030s.
This is an important decision, and it is based on the threats against us. It lays the foundation for the long-term development and strengthening of our defence beyond electoral terms.
At the same time, it is equally important that Allies in the rear do not tarry in making concrete investments in their defence. In the last resort, the defence capabilities of Allies in the rear will be used to help frontline Allies. That is why it is important that you, dear Ambassadors, convey the message of the importance of defence investment to all NATO countries.
Both the Ministry of Defence and the Finnish Defence Forces are already preparing the planned development of Finland’s defence. The task is massive and highly important.
Another important task is the preparations for our NATO integration and our role in NATO as part of the development of our defence.
On a general note, the preparations linked to our membership in NATO are progressing as planned at the Ministry of Defence. The variety of work involved is immense, ranging from legislative work to the activities of forces.
To put simply, Finland is already part of NATO’s deterrence and defence.
In military terms, the focus is on our ability to defend Finland and Europe on land, at sea and in the air as well as in the cyber domain together with our allies.
The Finnish Defence Forces and the Ministry of Defence have sent personnel to NATO structures. We will raise the number of Finnish personnel in NATO structures gradually and according to plan.
Finland is part of NATO’s defence planning and the DDA Family of Plans.
Finland has been contributing to NATO's high readiness activities on a broad basis since the start of our membership. We have deployed detachments to NATO’s Air Policing missions in Iceland and Romania and vessels to NATO's Standing Naval Forces in the Baltic Sea and the North Sea.
We are also participating in NATO’s ongoing Baltic Sentry mission which protects critical undersea infrastructure in the Baltic Sea, among other tasks.
The presence and activities of Allied forces have become more common in Finland.
In addition to organising multinational exercises, we are advancing the building of a NATO Headquarters and a presence of Forward Land Forces in Finland.
A Multi-Corps Land Component Command (MCLCC) will be established in Mikkeli with the capability of leading several army corps.
The MCLCC headquarters in Finland will prepare military action to defend the territory of Finland and has the readiness to command forces deployed to Finland if necessary.
Finland will also have the presence of NATO’s Forward Land Forces (FLF).
We are preparing the FLF concept in close cooperation with Sweden and NATO. In the summer, the countries that at this stage will be participating in the development of FLF in Finland were announced. I was joined in the announcement by the defence ministers of Sweden, the United Kingdom, Norway, Iceland, France and Denmark.
Important elements of both these NATO presence projects are advance preparation and exercises. On one hand, NATO forces must be able to operate in Finland as part of our homeland defence, if necessary. On the other hand, Finnish forces must be able to operate as part of multinational forces.
As I approach the end of my speech, I will share a few topical perspectives on comprehensive security and defence cooperation.
We have significantly stepped up our bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation.
This has especially meant working together with the United States, the United Kingdom, the Nordic countries and the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF). The EU, too, has an important role.
Our cooperation with the United States focuses on the implementation of the Defence Cooperation Agreement. That work has made good progress, even to the practical level.
At the same time, we have preparing extensive concrete measures, such building facilities and stockpiles needed by forces and activities.
Our other key partners have also increased their exercises and other activities in Finland over the past two years. This is a long-term effort to reinforce our defence.
Our defence cooperation is expected to deepen further in the next few years. One example I want to mention is our deepening defence cooperation with NATO partners in Asia. This cooperation focuses especially on defence materiel and technology research.
I’d like to conclude by saying a few words about comprehensive security, which is the fourth pillar of our defence policy.
In January 2025, the Government adopted a government resolution on the Security Strategy for Society.
The Security Strategy for Society is the most important document guiding comprehensive security in Finland. It describes the concept for comprehensive security and systematically assigns each branch of government strategic tasks to strengthen comprehensive security.
Vital functions of society will be safeguarded in collaboration with the authorities, business community, organisations and citizens.
As many of you have probably noticed, there has been a lot of international interest in Finland’s concept for comprehensive security. Many countries have recognised the critical importance of resilience to homeland defence and to countering hybrid threats.
In many contexts, people have said that our concept for comprehensive security has become a kind of an export product alongside preparedness.
The strategy outlines that Finland must strengthen its own security comprehensively. It also states that, besides preparedness, Finland must also improve its ability to respond to disruptions, crises and broad-spectrum influencing in society.
It is now important that each ministry and branch of government, public authorities, companies, the third sector and citizens start implementing the measures necessary for our preparedness and comprehensive security.
I thank you Ambassadors and representatives of other organisations present for your contribution to the advancement of our defence industry around the world.
Our defence industry is growing rapidly. There is already considerable demand for Finnish expertise in homeland defence, defence industry and technology.
I thank you all for your easy cooperation with the Ministry of Defence in our common mission to develop our defence.
I hope that this smooth cooperation between diplomatic missions and the defence administration will continue in future. It is now more important than perhaps ever before. Both for security and for economic growth.
I wish you every success in your demanding duties in the different time zones of the world.
Thank you.